Intelligence and Law Enforcement Data Sharing

Information sharing among law enforcement agencies has expanded significantly at all levels of government, improving the ability of law enforcement agencies to detect, prevent and respond to terrorist acts. The sharing of information on law enforcement agencies is not a one-time integrated process. Rather, it permeates business processes in multiple communities and at all levels of government. But these seemingly disjointed efforts have a lot in common. A fundamental element of an effective exchange of information across the enterprise is, for example, the use of information systems that regularly collect relevant data and make it available to authorised users in a timely and secure manner. Although the ISE focuses on terrorism-related information, many of the techniques used to improve the exchange of information on terrorism are also applicable to other types of crimes and vice versa. Criminal records, law enforcement incident reports, records of court actions and decisions, and watch lists of known and suspected terrorists are essential sources of important data that provide accurate, timely and complete information to law enforcement agencies across the country. My experiences, before and after September 11, led me to a simple but critical conclusion: integration works. To carry out the war on terror, intelligence and law enforcement officials must work together in a coordinated manner and exchange information quickly and regularly. For this reason, I strongly reject the call by some for the creation of a separate domestic intelligence service such as the UK`s MI-5. We should not separate from the FBI the responsibility for gathering domestic information on international terrorist activities. After tearing down the metaphorical wall that prevents the exchange of information between intelligence and law enforcement officials, it would be a grave mistake to erect new organizational walls between intelligence and law enforcement officials. Such walls would increase the risk that critical information will not be shared with law enforcement agencies in a timely manner and reverse the integration of intelligence and law enforcement efforts that have proven successful since September 11.

Since 9/11, federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have worked together to detect and prevent terrorist and other types of criminal activity. The FBI-sponsored Joint Task Forces on Terrorism (JTFFs) and fusion centers represent a cultural shift and willingness to share information between agencies and at all levels of government. Both are partnerships based on new policies, business processes, architectures, standards, and systems that give users the ability to collaborate and share information. In addition, both have resulted in important agreements and partnerships for the exchange of operational data reports, files and similar information on open and closed investigations. Unfortunately, before the terrible terrorist attacks of 11 September, I was arrested. In September 2001, as Deputy Attorney General of the United States, he witnessed serious deficiencies in the ability of intelligence and law enforcement officials to share information with each other, hampering the Justice Department`s ability to take action to defend the nation from terrorist attacks. However, section 218 of the PATRIOT Act amended the law to clarify that FISA can be used whenever foreign intelligence agencies are an “essential objective” of a national security investigation, allowing for greater exchange and consultation between intelligence and law enforcement officials. In addition, Section 504 of the PATRIOT Act specifically allows intelligence investigators to consult with federal law enforcement officials to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect against threats from foreign powers or agents. Web-based systems – It should be noted that many of the criminal justice information exchange systems that can be used by tribal criminal justice authorities are now web-based and do not require special equipment. Examples include the Department of Homeland Security`s Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), the FBI CJIS National Data Exchange (N-DEx), and the FBI CJIS Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal (LEEP). Although the status of material assistance to law enforcement agencies has been of paramount importance in the fight against terrorism, there are some weaknesses in the statute.

Several courts have ruled that key terms in the definition of substantial support for the law are unconstitutionally vague. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for example, ruled that the law`s prohibition on providing “training” and “personnel” to terrorist organizations is unconstitutionally vague. See Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Department of Justice, No. 02-55082 (9th Cir. 3 December 2003). While I do not necessarily agree with the Ninth District`s decision, the fact remains that, along with similar decisions, it creates a practical obstacle to bringing terrorists and their supporters to justice. However, it would be an unnecessary gamble to transfer the surveillance powers the FBI now has to an agency that has no track record and tradition of protecting fundamental freedoms. .